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Aids: A Threat to Blood
Donor Anonymity
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome) has come an enormous increase in lawsuits concerning dis-
crimination in the areas of employment, housing, health care,
insurance, and education.' In addition, tort actions have been brought
for the wrongful death of AIDS patients,2 and for alleged negligence
in exposing others to the disease.3 Because receiving transfused blood
is a recognized cause of AIDS,4 blood banks, and inevitably blood do-
nors, are sometimes viewed as having proximately caused the AIDS
victim's agonizing death. Consequently, when the suspected source of
AIDS is transfused blood, the victim seeking legal recourse may often
request the identities of the blood donors through discovery to deter-
mine if any of the donors have AIDS or are an AIDS carrier.
The rules of discovery in a large majority of states are substantially
similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 The rules of discov-
ery allow litigating parties to obtain any information relevant to the
subject matter of the pending case 6or reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.7  The scope of discovery is
1. See generally, Freedman, Wrong Without Remedy, 72 A.B.A.J. 36, 40 (June
1986).
2. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985), ffl'd, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987); Hyland Theraputics v. Superior Court., 175
Cal. App. 3d 509, 220 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1985) (lawsuit brought against the supplier of
plasma products that caused AIDS in the victim).
3. See, generally, Freedman, Wrong Without Remedy, 72 A.B.A.J. 36, 40 (June
1986).
4. The Center for Disease Control has reported that 849 cases of AIDS in the United
States have been identified as being caused by blood transfusions. Centers for
Disease Control, Update: Acquired Immunodefwiency Syndrome-United States,
36 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 522, 525 (1987), AIDS is transmitted
through the exchange of blood, semen, and possibly other body fluids through
sexual intercourse, the sharing of hypodermic needles, and transfusion. Special
Report Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 314 NEw ENGLAND JOURNAL OF
MED. 931 (1986).
5. J. CouPtD, J. FRIEDENTHAL, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 643 (3d ed. 1980).
6. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984).
7. F. JAMEs & G. HAzARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 243 (3d ed. 1985).
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broadly defined in order to facilitate the disclosure of the true facts of
a controversy rather than allow their concealment.8 A liberal applica-
tion of the rules helps to eliminate surprise at trial, simplify the issues,
and promote the settlement of cases. 9
Discovery of relevant matter is subject to two distinct limitations.
If the information sought is privileged or if discovery of the informa-
tion would result in annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense, the information is protected from disclosure.10 An
individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters is a pri-
vacy interest protected under the rules of discovery."i Lying some-
where in the "gray zone" between the AIDS victim's right to all
relevant information and the defendant's right to avoid disclosure are
the rights of volunteer blood donors who want to remain anonymous.
The Florida Supreme Court and the Florida Court of Appeals, in
South Florida Blood Service, Inc. v. Rasmussen,12 considered the ques-
tion of whether blood banks can, in response to a discovery request in
a private civil tort action, be compelled to release the names of volun-
teer blood donors. The Florida courts held that the donors' interest in
anonymity, combined with the nation's interest in maintaining an ade-
quate blood supply, outweighed a private litigant's right to discover
the names and addresses of donors whose blood was the possible
source of the plaintiff/victim's AIDS.
The precedential value of Rasmussen has somewhat been limited
by recent developments in the serological detection of AIDS. The in-
jury to Rasmussen occured in 1982, when blood banks were not yet
able to respond to the AIDS problem. It wasn't until March of 1983
that the U.S. Public Health Service responded to the threat of AIDS
from blood transfusions by publishing guidelines to be used by blood
banks in screening donors for the disease.' 3 Under these recommen-
dations, blood banks attempt to promote voluntary restraint from do-
nating by alerting individuals in high-risk groups of the potential
harms caused by their donation.' 4 This method of encouraging self-
8. City of Edmond v. Parr, 587 P.2d 56, 57 (Okla. 1978).
9. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984); Bond v. District Court ex
rel County of Denver, 682 P.2d 33, 40 (Colo. 1984).
10. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 244 (3d ed. 1985).
11. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart. 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984); South Florida Blood Serv.,
Inc. v. Rasmussen 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987).
12. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), aff'd 500 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 1987).
13. Centers for Disease Control, Prevention of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome (AIDS): Report of Interagency Recommendations. 32 Morbidity and Mor-
tality Weekly Report 101-03 (1983).
14. Id. High-risk individuals are members of groups in which there is a high inci-
dence of AIDS. AIDS occurs most often in two frequently ostracized groups-
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deferral' 5 was the only method of screening blood donations until
1985, when serologic testing of donated blood and plasma for HIV an-
tibody was implemented.16 The Rasmussen case preceded any of the
currently used methods of attempting to create an AIDS-free blood
supply.
An AIDS-free blood supply would eventually eliminate the need to
discuss donor confidentiality because transfusion-related AIDS would
not occur. However, the issue of donor confidentiality is still relevant
for three important reasons: (1) because AIDS antibody testing began
so recently, many cases that arose before testing was implemented are
still pending; (2) AIDS is a very latent disease-persons infected via
transfusions prior to AIDS antibody testing may not yet have the dis-
ease,17 and most importantly; (3) AIDS antibody testing is not 100%
effective in detecting AIDS.18
Because transfusion-related AIDS is not a "thing of the past," the
issue of donor confidentiality and the right to avoid discovery is not a
homosexual men and intravenous drug users. Special Report: Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome, 314 NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 931 (1986).
15. "Self-deferral" is used in medical literature when referring to voluntary restraint
from donating blood by members of high-risk groups. See, e.g., Melief & Goud-
smit, Transmission of Lymphotropic Retroviruses (HTL V-I and LAV/HTL V-III)
by Blood Transfusion and Blood Products, 50 Vox Sanguinis 1, 7 (1986).
16. Centers for Disease Control, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-
United States, 35 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 17,20 (1986). The viral
agent for AIDS was previously known as HTLV-III/LAV. The HTLV-III/LAV
terminology has been replaced by an internationally used term, "HIV". This was
done to allow accurate monitoring and communication regarding AIDS on a
world-wide basis. The international classification of diseases was implemented
on January 1, 1988. Centers for Disease Control, Revision of HIV Classification
Codes, 36 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 821 (1988). Hereinafter, this
article will refer to the cause of AIDS under the HIV terminolgy although the
articles referenced may use the term HTLV-III.
17. Over 46,000 cases of AIDS have been reported to the CDC since 1981. The aver-
age length of time between infection with HIV and the onset of AIDS is over
seven years. Since blood banks only began testing for AIDS in 1985, incidences of
AIDS resulting from transfused blood that was never tested for HIV antibody
could occur until the early 1990's or even later.
18. The HIV Antibody test is not a diagnostic test for AIDS. The test being used to
screen for AIDS is an enzyme-linked immunosorbant assay (called ELISA for
short) which can test for the antibody to AIDS but not the disease-causing virus
itself. The test is very sensitive, but false negative results can be obtained. (A
"false negative" is a negative test result on blood from patients who have the
actual disease the test is designed to detect. HENRY, CLINICAL DIAGNOSIS AND
MANAGEMENT BY LABORATORY METHODS 528(16th ed. 1979)). In one study, two
percent of AIDS victims tested negative for AIDS antibody. These false negatives
may result from the character of the test or may be a result of the latency period
of the disease - the time period between exposure to the disease and the infected
person's formation of the antibody. Levine & Bayer, Screening Blood: Public
Health and Medical Uncertainty, 15 HASTINGS CTR. RPT. 8 (Sp. Supp. Aug 1985).
The antibody forms within two to three months of the first exposure to the virus.
Centers for Disease Control, Transfusion-Associated Human T-Lymphotropic
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moot issue. In evaluating the topic, this article is written exclusively
for application to volunteer blood donor systems and does not address
the rights of paid donors. The analysis will parallel the approach of
the Florida Court of Appeals by discussing the interests asserted by:
the plaintiff; the blood bank on behalf of its volunteer donors; and the
state.
II. SOUTH FLORIDA BLOOD SERVICE, INC. V. RASMUSSEN
A. Statement of Case
South Florida Blood Service, Inc. appealed from a trial court deci-
sion compelling the disclosure of the names and addresses of fifty-one
volunteer blood donors. The discovery request was made in prepara-
tion for a wrongful death action brought on behalf of the appellee,
Donald Rasmussen.
The accident occured on May 24, 1982, when Rasmussen was struck
by a vehicle while sitting on a bus bench.19 As a result of the accident,
Rasmussen was hospitalized for a number of months, receiving fifty-
one units of blood during his stay. The blood had been supplied to the
hospital by South Florida Blood Service, Inc. Rasmussen was diag-
nosed as having AIDS in July of 1983 and subsequently died of the
disease in June of 1984.
During discovery in the wrongful death action brought on Rasmus-
sen's behalf,20 the plaintiff served a Subpoena Duces Tecum on South
Florida Blood Services for the names and addresses of the fifty-one
Virus Type IlI/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus Infection from a Seronega-
tive Donor-Colorado, 35 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 389 (1986).
American Red Cross Blood Services laboratories have reached a specificity of
99.8% on blood donor AIDS testing. "However, in a population with a low preva-
lence of infection, even a specificity of 99.8% does not provide the desired predic-
tive value for a positive test." Centers for Disease Control, Update: Serologic
Testingfor Antibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 36 Morbidity and Mor-
tality Weekly Report 833, 834 (1988). At the time of this writing, one unfortunate
case had been reported to the Centers for Disease Control of a patient who ac-
quired AIDS from a unit of blood that tested negative for the disease. The donor
had been recently infected with AIDS and had not formed any detectable antibo-
dies at the time of HIV antibody testing by the blood bank. Centers for Disease
Control, Transfusion-Associated Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/
Lymphademopathy-Associated Virus Infection from a Seronegative Donor-Colo-
rado, 35 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 389 (1986).
Another source of test inaccuracy is the element of human error. Negligence
by the blood bank personnel performing the testing will remain a constant threat
to the goal of an AIDS-free blood supply.
19. Amended Brief of Petitioner, Donald Rasmussen, at 3, South Florida Blood Serv.,
Inc v. Rasmussen, 500 So 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
20. A wrongful death action was brought against the driver and the owner of the
vehicle involved in the accident. The plaintiff was seeking aggravated damages
for the subsequent death due to AIDS.
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donors whose donated blood had been transfused into Rasmussen.
The plaintiff asserted that, without the names and addresses of the
sources, he would be unable to prove that the transfused blood was the
source of his AIDS.21 The blood bank asserted that the information
was confidential and private and moved to quash the subpoena, or in
the alternative, receive a protective order regarding the scope of its
disclosure.22 From an order of the trial court compelling disclosure,
the blood bank appealed to the Third District Court of Appeals of
Florida. The appellate court held that the information requested was
not discoverable. 23 Rasmussen appealed this decision to the Florida
Supreme Court, which unanimously affirmed the appellate court's
decision.
B. Holding
The question presented on appeal before the Florida Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals was stated by the majority of the district
court panel as follows:
Do the privacy interests of volunteer blood donors and a blood service's and
society's interest in maintaining a strong volunteer donor system outweigh a
plaintiff's interest in discovering the names and addresses of the blood donors
in the hope that further discovery will provide some evidence that he con-
tracted the AIDS from transfusions necessitated by injuries which are the
subject of the suit?2 4
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision
to disallow disclosure of the identities of the blood donors. However,
the supreme court's opinion differed in two respects: (1) the supreme
court refused to base its decision on constitutional grounds as the ap-
pellate court had, and: (2) the supreme court was unwilling to state
that complete nondisclosure of the donors' names was the only effec-
tive way of preserving their privacy interests and society's interest in
the volunteer donor system.
The appellate court had specifically stated that "[c]ourt orders
which compel, restrict or prohibit discovery constitute state action
which is subject to constitutional limitations."25 Possibly to avoid af-
firming this statement, the supreme court, while agreeing that the do-
nors' rights were constitutionally protected, specifically stated that its
holding was not based on a constitutional analysis but rather on the
21. Amended Brief of Petitioner, Donald Rasmussen, at 5, South Florida Blood Serv.,
Inc v. Rasmussen, 500 So 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
22. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So.2d 798, 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
23. Id. at 804.
24. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 1987).
25. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
1987]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Florida discovery rules.2 6 Under either courts' opinion, the determi-
nation required a balancing of the plaintiff's interest in full recovery,
the interests of the volunteer blood donors in remaining anonymous,
and the impact upon the volunteer donor system that disclosure could
cause.
The courts quickly dismissed the plaintiff's interests as being in-
sufficient.27 The appellate court noted that none of the fifty-one do-
nors now have AIDS and that, even if the names and addresses were
made available and the plaintiff found that some of the donors were in
the high risk group, the evidence would still be insufficient to estab-
lish that any one of them has AIDS or that they transmitted it to Ras-
mussen.28 The claim that the identities of the blood donors had
significant probative value was therefore "dubious at best."29 Because
the information sought lacked probative value, it was given very little
weight in comparison to the interests of the volunteer donors and the
volunteer blood system.
The Florida discovery rules prohibit discovery that is annoying,
embarassing, oppressive, or that causes undue burden or expense. 30
The court held that the donors had a privacy interest in their anonym-
ity; disclosure of their names and addresses could lead to discrimina-
tion and embarrassment in light of the social stigma surrounding
AIDS.31 The inevitable result of disclosure would be the subpoening
of the fifty-one donors.32 The supreme court noted an even more dam-
aging prospect; the information would be extracted by questioning
friends and fellow employees.33 Because such questions would involve
probing into sensitive areas of the donors' lives,34 and include refer-
ences to their sexual practices, drug use, and medical history,35 both
courts found that the donors had a significant privacy interest in being
26. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533, 534-35 (Fla. 1987).
27. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), aff'd, 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987).
28. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
29. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1987).
30. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), aff'd 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987); FLA.R.CIv.P. § 1.280(c);
§ 1.410(b), § 1.410(d)(1) (Reissue 1967). Note that the Florida rules parallel the
federal rules as do the rules in the majority of the states. See supra note 5.
31. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), aff'd, 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987).
32. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
33. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987).
34. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), aff'd 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987).
35. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
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free from this intrusion.36
In determining the interest of society, the courts recognized the
volunteer blood system as essential to public health. In light of the
need for a constant blood supply, it is "in the public interest to discour-
age any serious disincentive to volunteer blood donations." 37 The po-
tential intrusion into the private lives of blood donors could result in
such a disincentive. The privacy interests of the donor and the need to
maintain a volunteer blood supply far outweigh the value of the infor-
mation to the plaintiff.38
With regard to the extent of disclosure, the appellate court held
that a complete denial of discovery was necessary to protect the pri-
vacy interests of the donors.39 However, the supreme court was un-
willing to rule out the possibility of a limited disclosure. It is
important to note that the issue presented to the Florida Supreme
Court was limited to two alternatives-total nondisclosure or total dis-
closure. Given these choices, the court decided that nondisclosure was
necessary for the protection of the donors' privacy interests.
It can be inferred from dicta in the supreme court opinion that a
method of restricted disclosure was preferred. The court stated that a
method could be formulated to verify whether any of the donors were
AIDS victims while preserving the confidentiality of the donors' iden-
tities.40 Since the subpoena in question was free of restrictions, the
supreme court felt compelled to affirm the appellate court's decision,
reasoning that the injury caused by unrestricted disclosure far out-
weighed the interests of the plaintiff.41
Chief Judge Schwartz of the appellate court registered the only
dissenting opinion. The crux of his argument was that the plaintiff's
rights to discovery should not be withheld because of its speculative
adverse effect on the blood supply.42 In his opinion, the plaintiff must
secure information that one or more of the donors has or is carrying
AIDS if he is to recover. Once the names and addresses were supplied
to the plaintiff's attorney, the dissent reasoned, the attorney would
likely be able to immediately identify those in the high risks groups
without any further intrusion into the donors' lives.43 If further prob-
36. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985). aff'd, 500 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1987).
37. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
38. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), aff'd, 500 So. 2d 533, 540 (Fla. 1987).
39. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
40. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987).
41. See, id. at 538.
42. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
43. Id.
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ing is attempted, the court can then be requested to step in, but until
this occurred, the donors' claims to a privacy right had not yet rip-
ened.44 However, if the donor was the cause of the AIDS, they them-
selves would want to know, and, more importantly, they should pay
for the harm they have done.45
Judge Schwartz further referred to the speculation of adverse ef-
fects on the blood supply as the "carnvival of horribles"46 and found
no basis in the concern. The disclosure of the names and addresses of
donors would not be harmful to the donors unless they were members
of the high-risk groups, therefore no disincentive should result. In
contrast, those in the high-risk groups may be discouraged from donat-
ing by the fear of disclosure. 47 Overall, in his opinion, any concerns
about a decreasing blood supply were too speculative to provide a basis
for denying the plaintiff's right to discovery. The fear of disclosure
will not injure the donor who is not in the high-risk group, but may
deter and even punish the high-risk group donors.
III. ANALYSIS
The Florida courts, in ruling on the right of volunteer blood donors
to remain anonymous, were faced with a novel question. Do blood do-
nors have a right to keep their names and addresses out of civil litiga-
tion? Cases can be found in which donors were trial witnesses in
actions against the blood bank,48 but no cases have addressed whether
and under what circumstances the names and addresses of the donors
could be subjected to discovery.
This complex issue has been raised in response to the serious
threat of AIDS in our society. The disease involves certain agonizing
death for its victims. 49 Victims and their families look to the legal
system for recourse. Yet, in conflict with the victim's right to recover
is the altruistic blood donor's fear of being "labelled" as having AIDS.
The disease has caused havoc in the lives of its victims because of the
panic and stigma with which it is associated.50 Against this backdrop,
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 806.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Moore v. Underwood Memorial Hosp., 147 N.J. Super. 252, 371 A.2d 105
(1977); Gilmore v. St. Anthony Hosp., 598 P.2d 1200 (Okla. 1979). Both cases in-
volved plaintiffs who were suing the blood bank for damages due to transfusion-
related serum hepatitis. The blood donors, who were the sources of the trans-
fused blood, offered testimony at the trials.
49. No one has ever recovered from AIDS and 80% die within two years of being
diagnosed. Freedman, Wrong Without Remedy, 72 A.B.A.J. 36 (June 1986).
50. A September 1985 Harris survey indicated that the country is deeply absorbed
with the question of AIDS, indicating something of a national crisis atmosphere.
Seventy-three percent of the public felt that AIDS was a "very serious" national
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the Florida courts were forced to make a decision.
Resolving issues in which opposing parties have legitimate yet con-
flicting interests requires a weighing and balancing of the competing
interests.51 The question ultimately addressed is whether the extent
of harm to the plaintiff by denial of disclosure outweighs the harm
caused to the persons seeking protection if disclosure is compelled.
The final consideration is whether significant state interests will be
affected by the decision.
A. The Plaintiff's Interest
The parents of Rasmussen sought damages for the wrongful death
of their son. The element of damages is undeniable and significant.
AIDS medical bills are overwhelming. 52 The disease results in the
loss of liberties and livelihood.5 3 Fear of death and ostracism from
society prevails in those stricken.5 4 In addition, the families are forced
to watch slow deterioration and eventual death of a loved one.s5
The request for disclosure of the names and addresses of the blood
donors was in response to the need of Rasmussen to prove the element
of causation. Although not specifically addressed in the case, the dis-
closure could also result in Rasmussen identifying another potentially
liable tortfeaser. In any litigation, the purpose of discovery is to as-
semble information and expose the merits of claims and defenses. To
carry out this purpose, the scope of discovery must be very broad.5 6
The discovery rules are an attempt to "make a trial less a game of
blind man's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and
facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." 57 The key determina-
tion is whether the information sought is relevant to the case, whether
it is relevant to the subject matter of the action or if there is a reason-
able possibility that the information requested will lead to other ad-
missible and relevant evidence.58
The plaintiff's argument was that, without the names and ad-
problem and nearly 95% expressed deep concern about the disease. Harris, Public
Concern Over AIDS Reaches National Crisis Level, The Harris Survey, Sept. 19,
1985 at 1.
51. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985), aff'd, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). See also, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977);
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570. (3d Cir. 1980).
52. The average medical bill for an AIDS patient is more than $200,000. Freedman,
Wrong Without Remedy, 72 A.B.A.J. 36 (June 1986).
53. See generally id.; South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So.2d 798, 800
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
54. Freedman, Wrong Without Remedy, 72 A.B.A.J. 36 (June 1986); Goldman &
Beachy, One Against the Plague, Newsweek, July 21, 1986.
55. Goldman & Beachy, One Against the Plague, Newsweek, July 21, 1986.
56. A. MILTz, ART OF ADVOCACY, DISCOVERY § 2.03 (1986).
57. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
58. Ex parte Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 397 So. 2d 98, 103 (Ala. 1981).
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dresses of the donors, it would be impossible to prove that the AIDS
was the result of a blood transfusion.59 This argument is strengthened
when one notes that the plaintiff was an alleged intravenous drug user
and therefore already at high risk of contracting AIDS.60 As a practi-
cal matter, this required the plaintiff to prove that it was the blood,
not intravaneous drug use, that caused the disease. The names and
addresses of the donors were certainly relevant to determining if the
donors were in the high-risk groups and could likely have transmitted
AIDS to a recipient.
While cognizant of the problem of proving causation, the Florida
courts held that the names and addresses would not significantly aid
the plaintiff in proving his case.6 1 The Florida supreme court offered
no explanation for this conclusion. The appellate court noted that ex-
pert testimony was available in support of a finding that the dece-
dent's AIDS was transfusion related.62 The appellate court further
based its decision on two separate findings: (1) none of the fifty-one
donors had been identified as having AIDS, and; (2) even if the discov-
ery revealed that some of the donors were in the high risk groups, that
would not establish that any one of them has AIDS, much less that
they transmitted it through transfusion.63
The courts' holdings were applied narrowly to the facts of the Ras-
mussen case and leave some questions unanswered. The first question
is whether the result would have changed if expert testimony had not
been available to the plaintiff. Without expert testimony, the plaintiff
may have a difficult (if not impossible) problem establishing the cause
of AIDS. Although Rasmussen was successful in retaining an expert,
other plaintiffs may be unable to retain expert testimony because of
the lack of information regarding the donors' identities and medical
backgrounds. Physicians may, in many cases, be unwilling to specu-
late as to the cause of AIDS in a particular individual without an op-
portunity to first research the blood sources.
Limiting the plaintiff to expert testimony in proving the cause of
AIDS deprives him of the use of the best evidence available. Expert
testimony is commonly relied on in medical malpractice actions be-
cause it is the only evidence of the professional standard available, and
it serves to explain difficult concepts to the jury. However, these cases
often become a battle of opposing expert opinions, leaving the jury to
decide which expert is more credible. The use of this inaccurate
59. Amended Brief of Petitioner, Donald Rasmussen at 5, South Florida Blood Serv.,
Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533, (Fla. 1987).
60. Id. at 6.
61. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), aff'd, 500 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1987).
62. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801 n. 6 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
63. Id. at 801.
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method of deciding claims may be unjustified when more accurate evi-
dence is available. Knowing whether any of the donors currently have
AIDS would be of considerable probative value, and also gives testify-
ing experts a basis for an opinion.
The second question unanswered in Rasmussen is whether all the
names would have been released if even one of the donors did have
AIDS. If one of the donors was an AIDS patient or victim, that do-
nor's name and address would be highly probative. However, the real
problem lies in the plaintiff's ability to investigate the question. The
supreme court agreed that Rasmussen should not have to rely on the
Blood Service's statement that none of the donors had AIDS.64 Ab-
sent some court intervention to verify the blood bank's statement,
there is no avenue available to the plaintiff in corroborating this infor-
mation. As the only entity with access to the donor identities, the
blood bank is assumed to be absolutely trustworthy in contacting all
the donors and in truthfully reporting the results of its inquiry.65
Although unarticulated in Rasmussen, the plaintiff has a further
interest in identifying the donor who is responsible for transmitting
the AIDS. It is certainly conceivable that individuals may negligently
or intentionally donate AIDS-infected blood. Total nondisclosure
serves to protect the donor but deprives the plaintiff and society of
placing the liability for the injury caused on the tortfeasor. Because
the plaintiff and society both have interests in revealing donors who
place their unknown recipients at risk of contracting AIDS, total non-
disclosure of the donors' names and addresses is not an effective
method of dealing with the issues of transfusion-related AIDS. There
is very little reason to protect donors who intentionally or negligently
transmit AIDS to others from liability for these acts.
B. The Interests of the Volunteer Blood Donors
Assuming that the requested information is relevant on the issue
of causation, two possible theories can be asserted by the blood bank to
prevent disclosure of the names and addresses of the donors. It can
assert that compelled discovery will result in an invasion of privacy.66
Under this theory, the Supreme Court has recognized that the right to
discovery may be outweighed by an individual's interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters.6 7 The right to privacy serves the pur-
pose of protecting an individual from annoying, embarrassing, or op-
64. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533, 537 n.8 (Fla. 1987).
65. The appellate court dissent noted the concern of allowing the blood bank to uni-
laterally investigate the backgrounds and medical conditions of the donors. South
Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 805 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
66. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977).
67. Id. at 599.
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pressive discovery.68 The blood banks of many states may also request
protection from disclosure by asserting that communications between
the blood bank and its donors are privileged.69
1. Invasion of privacy
The court of appeals in Rasmussen conceded that the issuing of a
court order is a state action,70 and therefore enforcing the order may
possibly subject a person to an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
The supreme court, basing its opinion on the rules of discovery, stated
that the ability to "limit or prohibit discovery in order to 'protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppession, or undue
burden or expense,'" gives the court the authority to protect the pri-
vacy interests of individuals.71 Therefore, under either courts' reason-
ing, the remaining question is whether the donors have a privacy right
worthy of protection.
The Supreme Court has recognized that pretrial discovery has a
significant potential for abuse. The abuse is not limited to causing de-
lay and expense at trial, but may seriously implicate the privacy inter-
ests of litigants and third parties. 72 There is an opportunity for
litigants to obtain information that is not only irrelevant, but if pub-
licly released, could cause damage to a person's reputation and pri-
vacy.73 The essential worth and dignity of every human being is
supported when a person's right to protect his reputation from unjus-
tified injury and wrongful hurt is preserved.74
The typical invasion of privacy case involves direct acquisition of
information that is private in nature. Private information includes in-
formation about one's body and state of health as revealed, for exam-
ple, in medical records,75 communications made to a psychiatrist, 76
68. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, n.21 (1984); South Florida Blood
Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), affd, 500 So.
2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987).
69. Privileged matter is not discoverable. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE
244 (3d ed. 1985). The identity of an organ donor was considered privileged infor-
mation in Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1983) (discussed infra).
70. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
71. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987).
72. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 30 (1984).
73. Id. at 31.
74. Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 301 (Iowa 1979)
(quoting the concurring opinion of J. Stewart in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75,
92 (1966).
75. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Home v.
Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1974); Wood v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App.
3d 1138, 212 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1985); City of Edmond v. Parr, 587 P.2d 56 (Okla.
1978).
76. Bond v. District Court ex rel County of Denver, 682 P.2d 33 (Colo. 1984).
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and information regarding the identity of natural parents.77 The re-
lease of an individual's identity can result in an intrusion into the per-
son's "zone of privacy" if the context of the release is damaging to his
reputation.7 8 The discovery request in Rasmussen requires disclosing
the names and addresses of the donors and may independently result
in not only damage to reputation, but loss of employment, housing,
and the ability to be free from social ostracism. In addition, the subse-
quent use of the information can allow further depositions of the do-
nors to obtain private information. The Rasmussen courts held that
these intrusions into the donors' lives constituted an invasion of pri-
vacy.7 9 However, the Florida Supreme Court would have allowed the
release of the names under conditions that restricted dissemination,80
possibly alluding to the use of in camera procedures at the trial court
level to preserve confidentiality.
Generally, release of a name and address reveals no information
damaging to an individual's reputation. However, the Supreme Court,
in Whalen v. Roe,8- acknowledged that reputational harm can result
from the disclosure of a name or address when the context of the re-
lease associates an individual with certain activities or characteristics.
Whalen discussed the privacy interest in anonymity of individuals us-
ing Schedule II drugs. The case challenged the constitutionality of re-
quiring that the state be provided with a copy of every prescription
filled for certain types of regulated drugs. Physicians and patients ar-
gued that patients had a privacy interest in remaining anonymous and
unassociated with Schedule II drug use and that the fear of identity
disclosure may discourage potential patients from seeking necessary
medical treatment.8 2
The Supreme Court rejected this argument for three reasons.
First, the court determined that monitoring the use of dangerous
drugs served a valid state interest - deterrence of potential viola-
tions.8 3 Second, the Court noted that the scope of the release of infor-
mation was very limited. Health Department officials were given
access to the information and judicial supervision was sufficient to
protect against any unwarranted disclosures, including the use of the
information in judicial proceedings.8 4 Finally, it is already an accepted
and essential part of modern medical practice to disclose private medi-
77. In re Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978).
78. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987) (cit-
ing Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 580 (1977)).
79. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) aff'd 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987).
80. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987).
81. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
82. Id. at 600.
83. Id. at 597-98.
84. Id. at 600.
1987]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
cal information to doctors, hospital personnel, insurance companies
and public health entities.8 5 In weighing the privacy interest
threatened and the consequences of nondisclosure, the Court held that
the disclosure of the names and addresses was constitutionally
acceptable.
Rasmussen resembles Whalen in that in both cases the reputa-
tional harm is caused by associating the identity of a person with an
"undesirable" activity or condition. In Rasmussen, the Florida court
noted that release of the names and addresses, when associated with
the potential for carrying AIDS, could cause severe reputational
harm.8 6 This holding is subject to some scrutiny. Being one of fifty-
one donors who could be responsible for AIDS transmission, it is ar-
gued, does not create a very strong implication that one is an AIDS
carrier. The implication is much stronger if only two donors are
involved.
However, even as an individual donor in a group of 51, damage
caused by unrestricted disclosure could be very great. Even a donor
who is confident that he is not in a high-risk group may question
whether he is one of the unfortunate few AIDS victims not identified
with a high-risk group.8 7 The donor may further question the fidelity
of his or her sex partner or be requested to submit to a deposition
concerning his sexual preferences and drug use.88 To avoid being de-
posed or to protect his own interests during the deposition, the donor
may need to seek legal counsel and expend time and money to assert
his privacy interest. Finally, reputational injury may result when
friends or co-workers of the donor are investigated. While asking such
probative questions, "[i]t will be functionally impossible to prevent oc-
casional references to AIDS."89
The inevitable probe into the volunteer donors' lives prompted the
Rasmussen courts to recognize the donors' need for protection.
Although its decision was based on state statutory grounds, the Iowa
supreme court discussed similar reasoning in Head v. Colloton.90 A
leukemia patient brought suit to compel a hospital to disclose the iden-
tity of a possibly compatible marrow donor. The dying patient re-
quested the name in order to make a personal plea for the marrow.
85. Id. at 602.
86. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So.2d 798, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
87. The percentage of AIDS victims not in high-risk groups is increasing. See graph
on distribution of AIDS, Centers for Disease Control, Update: Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 35 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Re-
port 17, 20 (1986).
88. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So.2d 798, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
89. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987).
90. 331 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1983).
[Vol. 66:863
BLOOD DONOR ANONYMITY
The name was withheld to protect the donor, who had chosen to re-
main anonymous and not to donate on behalf of strangers. The court
recognized that this was a privacy interest. 91 Similar reasoning has
been used to refuse disclosure of the names of natural parents who
have given up their children for adoption. The right to remain anony-
mous and free from subsequent communication with their natural off-
spring is a privacy interest.92
The right not to be implicated as having AIDS is at least as great as
the right to avoid requests to donate marrow or the privacy afforded a
natural parent who has placed its child up for adoption. Unrestricted
disclosure of donor identity can lead to severe consequences because of
the stigma attached to AIDS. The social ostracism experienced by
AIDS patients is derived from two sources: the stigma associated with
being a member of the high risk groups, 93 and the fear of the disease
itself.94 Mistaken beliefs have led to discrimination in employment,
education, housing, and even medical treatment.9 5 The severe and un-
justified adverse consequences to the AIDS patient make it very im-
portant that confidentiality be maintained.96 Although, by requesting
the names and addresses of the donors, no one is diagnosing the do-
nors as having AIDS, the implication of being a potential carrier of
AIDS could result in the same embarrassment and social stigma. Vol-
unteer donors therefore have a privacy right in not having their iden-
tity associated with AIDS.
2. Privileged Information
Closely linked to the concept of invasion of privacy is the recogni-
tion that some communications are intended to be confidential and
protected from discovery. Privileges concern confidential communica-
tions between persons holding confidential relationships to one an-
other: a husband and wife, an attorney and client, and fellow jurors.97
In addition, there exists a statutory privilege accepted in the majority
91. Id. at 876.
92. In re Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978).
93. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So.2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987).
94. A sizable number of people (37%) believe that AIDS can be contacted by simply
working side by side with an AIDS victim. Harris, Varying Degrees of Apprehen-
sion over AIDS Transmittal The Harris Survey, Sept. 23, 1985, at 1. Seventeen
percent believe that AIDS victims should be given the historic treatment given to
lepers - ostracism, to separate islands. Harris, Majority Favors Crash Govern-
ment Program to Treat AIDS, The Harris Survey, Sept. 26, 1985, at 1.
95. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985). See also, Freedman, Wrong Without Remedy, 72 A.B.A.J. 36 (June
1986).
96. Special Report- Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 314 NEw ENGLAND J. OF
MED. 931, 932 (1986) (discussing the need of medical professionals to keep the
results of AIDS antibody testing confidential).
97. F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, CFIL PROCEDURE 246 (3d ed. 1985).
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of states: the physician/patient privilege.9 8 This is the only established
privilege that could possibly be applied to the communications be-
tween a blood donor and a blood bank.
Since Florida is one of the minority of states that do not recognize a
physician/patient privilege, the Rasmussen court quickly dismissed
any defense of privilege.99 In those states that do recognize the privi-
lege, it is extended to the "treatment" of "patients" by a "physi-
cian."10 0 The difficulty in applying the concept to blood banks is
obvious: a blood bank is not a "physician," a donor is not a "patient,"
and donation is not "treatment." The relationship between a patient
and physician is based on the patient's need for the physician's exper-
tise. This differs from the relationship between a donor and blood
bank. The donor and blood bank work together not to afford a benefit
to either of them, but to a third person.
Yet the policies behind the patient/physician privilege apply
equally well to the blood bank's relationship with its donors. In light
of the current threat of AIDS, it is essential that volunteer donors feel
free, if not compelled, to disclose information concerning their sexual
activity, drug use, and any other activities that have been linked to
AIDS. The primary purpose of the physician/patient privilege of confi-
dentiality is to encourage the free disclosure of information between
the physician and patient and to protect the patient from the embar-
rassment and invasion of privacy the disclosure would cause.101 If pa-
tients believe that private communications to physicians are not kept
confidential, they will be deterred from disclosing the information. 102
Once a donor has unquestionably placed himself under the control
of laboratory personnel, he must rely on their professional skills as in
any other hospital-patient relationship.1 03 In discussing the confiden-
tial relationship between the hospital and a donor, the court reasoned
in Head v. Colloton that the "treatment" of a donor encompasses any
step in applying medical arts to a person.104 When a person submits to
a hospital procedure, a fiduciary relationship is developed. The duty
owed a donor should not depend on whether the procedure is for the
98. 81 AM. JUR. 2d Witnesses § 230 (1976).
99. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985). The physician-patient privilege has been accepted in Nebraska. See,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1985).
100. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1985). For a discussion of the scope of physi-
cian-patient privileges in the various states see 81 AM. JUR. 2d Witnesses § 230-31
(1976).
101. Parkson v. Central DuPage Hosp., 105 Ill. App. 3d 850, 853, 435 N.E.2d 140, 143
(1982); 81 AM. JUR. 2d Witnesses § 231 (1976).
102. Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp., 93 A.D.2d 491, 496, 463 N.Y.S.2d 224, 228 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983).
103. Id. at 876; Smith v. Hospital Auth. of Walker, Ect., 160 Ga. App. 387, 287 S.E.2d 99
(1981) (malpractice action brought by a donor against the laboratory).
104. Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870, 875 (Iowa 1983).
[Vol. 66:863
BLOOD DONOR ANONYMITY
person's benefit or the benefit of someone else.105 The Colloton court
recognized the existence of a confidential relationship between the
hospital and its marrow donors.
Donating blood requires medical procedures to be performed on
the donor by trained nurses and laboratory personnel. It is probable
that most individuals view the blood bank as an intergral part of the
health care field. Under any other similar circumstance, the public in-
fers that disclosures are kept private. Such inferences have been held
to create a warranty on the part of physicans that information will
remain confidential. The patient, in turn, has a right to rely on this
warranty.106
Currently, blood banks are relying on the self-deferral of potential
carriers as a means of decreasing the threat of AIDS from transfused
blood.107 Even when donors are aware that they are in high-risk
groups, under certain common circumstances donors feel compelled to
donate anyway. Suppose, for example, that a corporation periodically
sends its employees to the blood bank to donate. Among the group is a
homosexual who has never revealed his sexual preference to his fel-
low employees for fear of ridicule or loss of employment. A donor may
be willing to make up an excuse on one given day, but to use phony
excuses on every periodic donation day will appear very suspicious.
There will be considerable pressure on the employee to donate despite
his knowledge of the risk involved. A similar situation exists with re-
spect to requests from family members to donate on behalf of an ailing
relative or friend. Admittedly, such excuses for donating are ridicu-
lous, but unfortunately they occur and systems must be developed to
limit the damage caused. If the blood bank is prepared to provide ways
for these individuals to discretely inform the blood bank concerning
the risk of using the blood,108 and the donor is assured that the infor-
105. Id. at 879.
106. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
107. Melief & Goudsmit, Transmission of Lymphotropic Retroviruses (HTLV-I and
LAV/HTL V-IIl) by Blood Transfusion and Blood Products, 50 Vox Sanguins 1, 7
(1986). Authorities, noting that the HIV antibody test is not 100% effective in
detecting donors with recent infections, place a great deal of reliance on donor-
deferral programs. All prospective donors are informed of the practices associ-
ated with AIDS. The system has worked to substantially decrease the number of
high-risk individuals donating, but a few high-risk individuals continue to donate.
Centers for Disease Control, Transfusion-Associated Human T-Lymphotropic
Virus Type IlI/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus Infection from a Seronega-
tive Donor-Colorado, 35 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 389, 390 (1986).
108. A method of subsequent disclosure currently used by many blood banks is to give
every donor a card, stamped with the unit number, to be filled out before leaving
the blood bank. The donor is asked to indicate on the card if there is any reason
why the blood that has already been drawn should not be used. Blood banks be-
lieve this will alleviate some of the disasterous effects of pressured donations.
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mation will remain confidential, the system of self-deferral will be
more effective.
The fear of tort liability could be a useful tool in deterring those in
high-risk groups from donating. The dissenting appellate court judge
stated that a possible benefit of disclosure would be discouraging high-
risk individuals from donating.109 Although the statement is logically
sound, this method of promoting self-deferral may also discourage
many healthy donors.11o The length, expense, and unpredictability of
attempting to avoid further probing discovery is more than donors
want to be exposed to, especially when the exposure results from what
the donor views as a voluntary, altruistic act. A strong argument can
be made that the more efficient method of encouraging self-defferal,
without alienating healthy donors, is to provide an atmosphere of con-
fidentiality between the donor and blood bank.
The release of the donor names in Rasmussen would have been
done in the course of searching for an AIDS victim or carrier on whom
to place the guilt. The context of this disclosure would have implicated
the donors as having AIDS. Institutions, as caretakers of medical
records, have standing to assert the rights of individuals to avoid dis-
closure of their records through discovery processes.1 1 1 With access to
the names and addresses, the plaintiff's attorney, upon showing that
the information is relevant to determining the cause of AIDS, can sub-
poena the donors to ascertain whether they are in high-risk groups. If
a physician/patient privilege can be asserted by the blood bank, re-
lease of the names and addresses would result in a breach of a confi-
dential relationship.
c. Waiver of the Right of Privacy or Privilege.
A remaining question is whether donors waive or lose their right of
confidentiality and privacy upon donating. A privacy right can be lost
when one willingly or unwillingly becomes involved in a matter of le-
gitimate public interest. 12 However, the cases allowing an involuntary
waiver of the right to privacy usually involve the countervailing first
amendment right of the freedom to publish information of legitimate
109. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
110. The dissenting judge of the appellate court strongly disagreed. In his opinion "no
one not in a risk group would be likely to have any hesitancy in giving blood no
matter what we do in this case." Id.
111. Marcus v. Superior Court, 18 Cal App. 3d 22, 95 Cal Rptr. 545 (1971); Parkson v.
Central DuPage Hosp., 105 Ill. App. 3d 850, 853-54, 435 N.E.2d 140, 142 (1982);
Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1983); City of Edmond v. Parr, 587 P.2d 56
(Okla. 1978).
112. Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967 (D. Minn. 1967), affd 398
F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968); Annotation, Waiver or Loss of Right of Privacy, 57
A.L.R. 3d 16, 33 (1974).
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public concern.1 3
When private information becomes a matter of legitimate public
concern, the individual's privacy right in that information is lost.114
Applying this rule to Rasmassen, an argument can be made that the
identities of the donors is a legitimate public concern. The identity of
the donor or donors who were the source of Rasmussen's AIDS is defi-
nitely of legitimate public concern. Whether the donor knowingly or
unknowingly donated AIDS-infected blood, he or she is a source for
the further spread of the disease. While it is true that the donor has a
privacy interest in the facts regarding his or her health, that interest
may be lost to the public's need to control the disease.
The same analogy does not apply to the healthy donors. The prac-
tice of donating blood is not unique and in the case of healthy donors,
is not dangerous to the public. Further, knowing the identities of the
healthy donors in Rasmussen would add nothing to the plaintiff's
case. Therefore, there is no public interest involved in knowing the
identities of the healthy donors that can justify subjecting them to a
loss of their interest in privacy.
Distinct from the concept of a loss of privacy rights is the principle
of waiver. Waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a
known right and is manifested expressly or impliedly by the conduct
of the party.1 1 5 An implied waiver can only arise when the conduct
clearly manifests an intent to waive a legal right.116
In the context of patient-physician privileges, when a patient initi-
ates a lawsuit for damages resulting from allegedly negligent medical
care, he has waived his right of privacy and confidentiality.117 The
waiver does not extend into areas of medical history that the patient
has not voluntarily disclosed,s1 8 but is limited so as not to unreasona-
bly intrude on the patient's right of privacy.'1 9 Waiver has also been
discussed in the context of the constitutional right of associational pri-
vacy.120 For example, when the plaintiff impliedly waives his right of
privacy by bringing a legal action placing his financial affairs at issue,
the scope of the waiver will be narrowly construed so that plaintiffs
will not be deterred from bringing legitimate lawsuits.
Overall, it appears that to waive a right of privacy for the purposes
113. See, e.g., id.; Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208
(1961).
114. Annotation, Waiver or Loss of Right of Privacy, 57 A.L.R. 3d 16, 33 (1974).
115. Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Comm'n, 304 N.W.2d 239, 249 (Iowa 1981).
116. Annotation, Waiver or Loss of Right of Privacy, 57 A.L.R. 3d 16, 41 (1974).
117. Jones v. Thornton, 172 Ga. App. 412, 323 S.E. 2d 217 (1984); Glenn v. Kerlin, 248
So. 2d 834 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
118. Jones v. Superior Ct., 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 551, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148, 158 (1981).
119. Id.
120. Moskowitz v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 4 (1982).
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of discovery, there must be a voluntary intent to do so. When the pri-
vacy interest is waived, the scope of the waiver will be limited. In the
Rasmussen case, the voluntary donors, by donating blood, probably did
not intend to simultaneously waive their privacy rights. It can be ar-
gued that voluntarily donating blood waives the right of privacy in the
blood product and any knowledge of the donor that may affect the
safety of that blood. In order for their voluntary act of donating to
imply a waiver of the privacy right in their identity, donors must rec-
ognize that the donation could ultimately result in the release of their
names. Donors are notified that their identities may be released to
public health officials but are not told that it could be released for
other purposes. The donors are often led to believe that their identi-
ties will be kept confidential by blood bank personnel. Confidentiality
is also inferred from the fact that donor units are not identified by
name but by number. Although donors realize that their blood will be
given to other patients, they have every reason to believe that their
individual identities will not be released to any entity but public
health agencies.
In light of the willingness of courts to narrowly construe the scope
of a waiver of privacy rights, the voluntary donating of blood is proba-
bly not a waiver of a privacy right. In addition, simply because donors
consent to a release of their identities to public health officials does
not mean that they have waived their right of privacy as to anyone
requesting the information.
3. The State Interest:
A state may properly assert important interests to safeguard the
health of its people.121 In Whalen, the Court upheld mandatory re-
cording of Schedule II drug prescriptions because of the strong state
interest in deterring drug abuse. Likewise, in Rasmussen, the court
rested more on public policy concerning the health of society than on
either the plaintiff's or donor's rights in the action. However, society's
interests in Rasmussen are twofold: the interest in maintaining an ad-
equate blood supply and the interest in maintaining a healthy blood
supply.
The Rasmussen supreme court held that society's interest in main-
taining an adequate blood supply was protected by total nondisclosure
rather than the unrestricted disclosure of the donor names and ad-
dresses. The disregard of the donors' privacy interests could result in a
serious disincentive to donate. The majority opinion reveals the cru-
cial concern of maintaining the volunteer blood system in the United
States. In 1974, the United States adopted the National Blood Pol-
121. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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icy, 122 a system devised to insure that the nation's demands for blood
products are served through volunteer sources. Experience had re-
vealed that paid donors were often in poor health and dependent on
drugs and alcohol.12 3
A return to using paid donors as a source of blood could result in a
serious threat to a healthy blood supply. If the volunteer blood supply
does not meet demands, reliance on blood from paid donors will be
necessary. Because paid donors often include more individuals in poor
health or using illegal drugs, the use of blood from paid sources could
actually increase the prevalence of diseases, including AIDS, in the
blood supply.1 24
The volunteer blood donors are motivated by a sense of altruism or
duty. They do not receive a monetary reward for donating blood. On
the contrary, donating blood requires time and conscious effort on the
part of the donor. The volunteer blood system has proven very sucess-
ful, with the vast majority of blood provided in the United States now
coming from volunteer sources.1 2 5 However, some metropolitan areas
receive significant portions of their blood supply in the form of
"Euroblood" - blood imported from European sources. 12 6 The recent
AIDS scare has had an impact on some blood markets. An erroneous
belief exists that one can acquire AIDS from giving blood.127 The Sur-
geon General has responded to this threat of decreases in the blood
122. 39 Fed. Reg. 32701 (Sept. 10, 1974).
123. R. TITMUss, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP 114 (1971). Of extreme importance in estab-
lishing an AIDS-free blood supply is a volunteer donor system. The volunteer
blood system was first promulgated to lower the risks of infectious hepatitis in
donor blood. Purchasing blood attracts alcoholics, addicts, and undernourished
persons who are willing to give fictitious names, addresses, and medical histories
in order to sell their blood. Id. at 114-15.
124. The rate of hepatitis infection was three times as likely when the donations came
from commercial sources. BLOOD POLICY: IsSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 18 (D. John-
son 1976). The significance of this statistic lies in comparing the composition of
the high-risk groups in hepatitis and AIDS. The high-risk groups for the disease
of hepatitis are identical to those of AIDS: drug abuse, male homosexuality, and
blood transfusion. Id. at 19. From this it can be inferred that if paying donors
attracts individuals that are at high-risk of carrying hepatitis, it will also attract
individuals who are at a high-risk of carrying AIDS. In addition, the current test-
ing of units for hepatitis yields many false negatives. Even if the HIV Antibody
testing could help to eliminate AIDS-infected blood, the use of paid donors may
well increase the disease of hepatitis in the blood supply.
125. In 1979, 95.5% of all blood collected was derived from volunteer donors. U.S.
Dep't. of Health and Human Services, NIH Publication No. 85-2028, The Nation's
Blood Resource. 8 (March 1985).
126. In 1975, Euroblood accounted for over twenty percent of all the blood used in
New York City. BLOOD POLICY: IssuEs AND ALTERNATIVES 178 (D. Johnson
1976). The total imported blood supply from Europe in 1979 was 258,000 units.
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, NIH Publication No. 85-2028, The Na-
tion's Blood Resource, 10 (March 1985).
127. Blood Banks Still Cope with AIDS Fears and Myths, 60 Hospitals 74 (Jan. 5,1986).
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supply by publishing the following statement in newspapers across
the nation.
There is no way that a donor can contract AIDS or any other disease by giving
a pint of blood. Despite the known safety of donating blood, some people are
afraid to give. In fact, blood donations are down from a year ago, and there is
evidence that some previous donors are staying away from blood drives be-
cause they are afraid they will get AIDS. 128
Product supply is as vital to a safe blood bank system as product
safety 29 From a purely statistical analysis, even a minor decrease in
blood supply will effect more patients in the United States in one year
than the total number of transfusion-related AIDS cases reported in
this country to date. The total number of units transfused in 1979 was
13,389,224.130 Even a 1% decrease in blood supply will affect the lives
of over 100,000 patients per year. In contrast, recent statistics show
that over the last six years combined, less than 1500 cases of blood-
product-associated AIDS have occured. Transfusions have caused 849
cases of AIDS, and an additional 364 cases have occured among pa-
tients with coagulation disorders who receive blood plasma
products. 31
The dissent in Rasmussen demonstrated a total misunderstnding of
this AIDS dilemma in blood banking. First, a vehement denial of the
potential for causing an inadequate supply of blood was issued, and
reference to the concern as projecting a "carnival of horribles," was
made.1 32 The dissent argued that no restrictions should be placed on
the release of the donors' identities until there was sound evidence of
its adverse effect on the blood supply.1S3 This short-sighted opinion
basically proposes that disclosure should be allowed, and if the blood
supply drops as a result, blood banks can then struggle to regain the
public's confidence. In the meantime, blood banks would be forced to
rely on paid donors to maintain an adequate supply.
Perhaps the most erroneous point in Judge Schwartz's opinion is
his "good versus evil" approach to the problem. To paraphrase his
opinion, it is beneficial to disclose the names of donors to discourage
high-risk individuals from donating. On the other hand, those not in
the high-risk groups should not be discouraged from donating, pre-
128. Public Health Service, Department of Health and Human Services, Donate Blood
Regularly (December 1984), reprinted in South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Ras-
mussen, 500 So. 2d 533, 538 n.11 (Fla. 1987).
129. Miller & Simon, AIDS, Ethics, and the Blood Supply, 25 Transfusion 174, 175
(1985).
130. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, NIH Publication No. 85 - 2028, The
Nation's Blood Resource, 11 (March 1985).
131. Centers for Disease Control, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-
United States, 36 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report 522, 525 (1987).
132. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
133. See id.
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sumable because they have nothing to hide. The protection this ap-
proach affords the donor is negligible. For example, in Rasmussen
fifty-one blood donors were involved. Chances are, however, that only
one of these fifty-one donors carried the AIDS which caused the trans-
fusion death. Once all fifty-one names are disclosed and the privacy
interests of the healthy donors have been injured, it is too late to re-
store their loss of privacy interest.
The judge further challenged the necessity of protecting donors at
all by placing reliance on a test that does not exist - a test for the
AIDS virus that is 100% accurate.1 3 4 Presumably, he is referring to the
HIV antibody testing which cannot test for the virus and can produce
erroneous results.135 The test can never insure that "no one will ever
acquire AIDS and no future donor will therefore have reason to be
discouraged" from donating blood.136
4. Alternative Methods of Balancing the Interests of the
Plaintiff, Blood Donors, and Society.
The state has a valid concern in maintaining blood quality and
identifying those who negligently or intentionally donate AIDS in-
fected blood, thereby increasing the spread of AIDS in our society. By
allowing total nondisclosure, the appellate court effectively eliminated
the state's ability to monitor this type of activity. Without the identi-
ties of the unhealthy donors, the state cannot act to insure that the
donor does not donate again. Limiting the choices concerning disclo-
sure to either nondisclosure or unrestricted disclosure effectively lim-
its the states' ability to protect both the supply and the quality of
blood.
Following the Rasmussen case, hearings were presented before the
subcommittee on Health and the Environment concerning the issue of
blood donor confidentiality. Numerous authorities made statements
indicating a genuine concern for maintaining the confidentiality of do-
nors. The reasons expressed included respecting the dignity of those
who altruistically give and their right to be free from invasion of their
privacy.137 The presentations also expressed a concern for the blood
supply if these rights were ever abrogated through the process of dis-
covery.'38 The ultimate requests were for a federal statutory right of
134. Id. n.4.
135. See Centers for Disease Control, supra note 16.
136. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 806 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
137. Protection of Confidentiality of Records of Research Subjects and Blood Donors:
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the Committee
on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1985) (Statement of Frank E.
Young, M.D., Ph.D., Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Dept. of Health and
Human Services).
138. Protection of Confsdentiality of Records of Research Subjects and Blood Donors:
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confidentiality to be extended to blood donors and research donors. To
date, this type of federal bill has not been passed.
HIV antibody testing in blood banks has certainly provided a new
reservoir of information concerning the sources of AIDS. Discussions
of the scope of the confidentiality of the records reveal that there are
multiple viewpoints on whether the information should be confiden-
tial, even from health officials. 139 Some believe that, at most, only
public officials should be allowed to know the results of an HIV an-
tibody test.140 Others specifically noted Rasmussen and expressed a
concern that the information should not be available for use in tort
litigation.'41
It appears from the discussions that blood banks are advocating to-
tal nondisclosure of donor identities as an attempt to protect donor
confidentiality and maintain blood quality and supply. The opposing
argument, as exemplified by the dissenting opinion in Rasmussen, sug-
gests that complete disclosure, even for tort litigation, may improve
blood quality yet not injure the blood supply or the donor's privacy
interest. It would seem that a compromise must exist between these
two opposing stances.
One effective compromise would be the use of a protective order
restricting the dissemination of the donors' identities. The protective
order is an effective way of avoiding the abuse, oppression, and injus-
tice that results from revealing the identities of third parties to an ac-
tion.142 In Whalen, the court's ability to limit the scope of disclosure
and regulate the use of the information was considered adequate pro-
tection of the privacy interests.1 43
The trial judge is the appropriate entity to receive any records re-
garding donor identities and to analyze the probative value of the in-
formation. Rasmussen should not be forced to rely on the Blood
Service's statement that none of the donors have AIDS,144 yet the do-
nors should not be forced to relinquish control of their privacy inter-
ests to the plaintiff. In Rasmussen, the plaintiff had argued that his
inquiry "may never go beyond comparing the donors' names against a
list of known AIDS victims" or against other public records such as
conviction records regarding intravenous drug use.145 The judge is
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the Committee
on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-83 (1985).
139. Id. at 130.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 113-14.
142. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984).
143. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 601-02 (1977). The Whalen Court indicated that once
the Health Department had the information, the use of the information for litiga-
tion purposes was to be protected by the judicial system. Id.
144. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
145. Id.
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equally equipped to compare the names to these lists without ever re-
vealing the names to anyone else, including the plaintiff.
To the extent possible, the trial judge can attempt to discern which
donors may have been responsible for the victim's AIDS.146 The iden-
tities of the healthy donors are not relevant to finding the cause of
transfusion-related AIDS and therefore should not be disclosed. How-
ever, if a donor is found that negligently or intentionally donated
AIDS-infected blood, both the state and the plaintiff have a very
strong interest in knowing the unhealthy donor's identity. Because the
blood bank records are the only source of this information and the
information is of legitimate public concern, a strong argument exists
that the unhealthy donor's identity should be released. A donor who
has acted so irresponsibly as to effectively kill another human being
should not be allowed to exploit the right of privacy to escape
punishment.
The result of restricting disclosure to an in camera viewing by the
trial judge is that the state can guard the quality of blood with only a
minimum invasion of the donors' privacy. Consequently, healthy do-
nors will not experience the disincentives to donate that full disclo-
sure would cause. Restricted disclosure can therefore serve to protect
both the quantity and quality of blood resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because of the inconsistency caused when courts attempt to bal-
ance the competing interests in proving the cause of AIDS, there is an
immediate need for legislatures to make a determination of the rights
of volunteer blood donors. Until this is done, donor records will con-
tinue to be the source of litigation. With the increase in AIDS-related
litigation, it is likely that the frequency of cases like Rasmussen will
also increase. Plaintiffs will request the information and blood banks
will expend large sums of money on legal fees to protect the privacy
interests of the donors, each time taking a risk that donor confidenti-
ality will not be upheld.
Rasmussen demonstrates that the federal and state governments
are lagging far behind the eminent issues of AIDS. The disease that
146. The judicial system has accepted the role of reviewing information that could be
confidential and private in nature and determining if the benefits of its release
outweigh the interests in privacy and the state's interest. See, e.g., Nixon v. Ad-
ministrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (judiciary to review informa-
tion asserted by the president to be private in determining what evidence was
relevant to the grand jury investigation. Irrelevant information was to remain
confidential). In Re Application of George, 625 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
(Trial judge directed to make contact with the natural parents of a child in need
of a marrow transplant. The identity of the parents were not to be disclosed to
anyone else unless the parents allowed the disclosure).
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has swept the country with epidemic proportions of death and caused
a general state of panic has also squarely presented a question as to the
privacy rights of blood donors. Twelve years ago, federal health offi-
cials promulgated a program asking citizens to voluntarily give blood
to protect society as a whole from disease. It is difficult to justify sub-
jecting those who voluntarily and altruistically donate blood to an un-
bridled invasion of their privacy right to be free from the reputational
harm and stigma associated with AIDS.
No doubt a strong interest lies in eliminating AIDS from the blood
supply. However, this goal can certainly be carried out more effi-
ciently by allowing only restricted disclosures of information. The po-
tential damage of an unrestricted disclosure will discourage not only
high-risk group donors but also healthy donors. A decrease in volun-
teer donors will increase the necessity of using paid donors to meet
blood demands, thereby perpetuating the problem of AIDS in the
blood supply.
Education of the public could help dramatically in reducing the
AIDS virus in the blood supply. With understanding of the actual
causes of the disease comes an ability on the part of individuals at risk
to make a thoughtful decision regarding self-deferral. In addition, an
educated public is less likely to harbor the fallacies and fears associ-
ated with AIDS. The attitude and treatment of AIDS victims could
change to less ostracism and more empathy, resulting in more honesty
on the part of those who are in high-risk groups or carry the AIDS
virus.
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